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THE TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL
LECTURE
The family andfriends of Tyrrell Williams, a distinguished member of
the Washington University School of Lawfacultyfrom 1913-1946, estab-
lished the Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture in 1948. Since its inception,
the Lectureship has provided a forum for the discussion of issues sign#f-
cant to the legal community and society at large. Former Tyrrell Wil-
liams Lecturers include some of the Nation's most distinguished legal
scholars, eminent practicing attorneys, and Supreme Court Justices.
Clark M. Cliford, renowned statesman and scholar, delivered the Tyr-
rell Williams Memorial Lecture on March 26, 1980, on the campus of
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.
"IN THE 80'S: WILL IT BE WORLD PEACE OR
WORLD WAR?"
CLARK M. CLIFFORD
It is a delight to me to return to Washington University under such
felicitous circumstances. I wish to thank Judge Webster for his very
generous introduction. As a citizen, I would also like to thank him for
taking on the directorship of the F.B.I., one of the most difficult jobs in
Washington, and for performing so splendidly. As an alumnus, I
should like to express my appreciation to Chancellor Danforth for the
unique and superb leadership that he has given to my Alma Mater. To
Dean Foote go my congratulations for transforming the Law School
from just a law school into one of the leading institutions of its kind in
the country.
I had the privilege of knowing Tyrrell Williams. He was a splendid
lawyer, an inspired teacher, and a warm and compassionate human be-
ing. An incident happened in the second year I was in the Law School
that I shall always remember. My friend, Carleton Hadley, and I had
arranged for an incident to occur over on the college part of the cam-
pus. It had gone beautifully and provided considerable amusement for
many. But one day, shortly thereafter, disaster struck when we each
received a summons to appear before the College Disciplinary Board.
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We talked it over very seriously. We felt that our careers were at stake
and we decided to go see Tyrrell Williams. I remember it was in the
late afternoon and the shadows were beginning to fall at his office. We
stood in the doorway and rapped hesitantly on the door frame and he
said, "Come in." The two of us stood in front of his desk while he
finished reading the paragraph, and he then said, "Gentlemen, what
can I do for you?" I said, "Dean Williams, Carleton and I have been
summoned to appear before the College Disciplinary Board." There
was a moment's hesitation, then Tyrrell Williams said, "Who brings
this unjust charge?"
Well, what a benediction! Our concern, a concern of guilty con-
sciences, began to subside. The Dean worked with us, went to the
meetings with us, represented us, and for better or for worse, saved our
careers.
At the time, when the great English lexicographer, Dr. Samuel John-
son was at the height of his fame, a writer of that day, who had an
inflated opinion of his own ability and prominence, sent a manuscript
to Dr. Johnson and asked him for his comments. Dr. Johnson read it
and wrote him the following letter:
Dear Sir,
I have read your manuscript. It is both good and original. The trouble
with it, however, is that the part that is good is not original; and, the part
that is original is not good.
Very truly yours,
I do not know what grade my remarks today will receive, but I wish
to assure you that my thoughts are my own and they do not under any
circumstances, represent the opinion of the management.
My subject today is a serious one. It is particularly serious to men
and women in college. We must face up to events today, which are
happening very rapidly. It is a truism, that if we wish to understand
where we are today, we must look back and see where we have been.
There is engraved in stone at the National Archives in Washington, the
words, "The Past Is Prologue." So in my allotted time, I believe we
should first go back and see where we have been, then we must evalu-
ate where we are today. Then, I would like to talk briefly about a pro-
gram for the future.
We first entered, in a major way, into international affairs, as a Na-
tion, when we entered into World War I in 1917. And our attitude at
that time, was that this Nation, growing in strength and influence,
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could end the war. As a result, the slogan was invented, "This would
be the war to end all wars." And it might have been. Maybe we were
somewhat ingenuous. But, the war was fought and won. And then we
made a grievous mistake after the war was over. We rejected the
League of Nations, and seeds were planted that led to later conflict.
The war ended in 1918, with the expectation that we would not see war
again.
But then in the last half of the 1930's, there came about the most
sinister development that had occurred in the history of mankind. It
was the rise of Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. As Hitler started
his planned moves into the various countries which he chose to over-
run, there were complaints, but no one took the necessary action to stop
him. So that he moved from one conquest to another, and then ulti-
mately his actions brought about the Second World War.
Now, as you go back and read about that period, you find that the
nations of Western Europe, when confronted with the aggression of
Hitler said repeatedly, "We want peace. We do not want difficulty with
him. We want peace." And then they would go sit down and talk to
Hitler. And then they would come back and say to their people, "We
are making progress." It was finally, when he invaded Czechoslovakia,
that the British Prime Minister travelled to Munich, conferred with
Hitler, and then went back to England and said, "We have achieved
peace in our time." No greater fraud was ever perpetrated on the world
than Hitler's contention that peace had been accomplished. He already
had the plans in mind for world conquest. It was when he marched
into Poland that he triggered the Second World War.
We became involved in it later on. And we fought through it at
enormous expense, with millions killed and billions of the world's trea-
sures scandalously wasted. But ultimately it was brought to a conclu-
sion. We had learned a good deal from it. We had also learned much
from the First World War, and we were in the process of putting those
lessons together and adopting a policy.
As we came to the end of the Second World War in 1945, the most
fervent, profound hope that President Truman had was, that after hav-
ing been allies with the Soviet Union through that terrible war, we
could develop a concord with the Soviets that would permit us to build
with them a permanent peace in the world. But it was not to be. They
had entirely different plans. During the closing days of the Second
World War and thereafter, the Soviets moved in and annexed all the
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nations on their western periphery: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulga-
ria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary. They took them
all. These countries were to be a barrier against any possible future
aggression from the West. Then they developed the Comintern, which
was a type of cell in every nation of concern to them in the world, and
they would fan out from that cell and attempt to spread the philosophy
of Communism.
Then they started a more ominous move and that was their intrusion
into Western Europe. I happened to be with President Truman, in De-
cember 1946, at the time we received the British message that said they
could no longer support Greece and Turkey. And President Truman
was faced with a most difficult and complex problem at the time. We
had been through this ghastly war. We had lost three hundred thou-
sand men. It had not been over for very long, and then here again we
were faced with new aggression. But, he acted decisively. He acted
courageously. He acted with great determination. I remember the
thrill, at his appearance before the Joint Session of the Congress on
March 12, 1947, when he gave a speech in which he enunciated what
became known as the Truman Doctrine. He said it shall be the policy
of the United States to help the other nations in the world resist the
aggression of Communist forces. He saved Greece and Turkey. Any
time I am in Greece, something important happens to me when I see
the statue that those people have erected in their central square to Pres-
ident Truman.
He went on and did more than that. Next came the Berlin Airlift in
which we demonstrated to the Soviets our determination and we saw
that through to a successful conclusion. And then as they were increas-
ing the pressure against other nations in Western Europe, the United
States came forward with the concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization, which became known as NATO. And what we said to the
Soviets, in that treaty, was just as clear as it could be. In effect we
stated, you may do what you wish, but if you attack any member of the
alliance in Europe you are attacking the United States of America.
The message was plain and simple, and the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization has maintained the peace in Europe for thirty-one years.
We did the same with Japan. We entered into a treaty with Japan and
notified the Communists that if they chose to move on Japan, it would
be construed as a hostile movement against the United States. We have
kept the peace in that area to the present time.
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We can understand how we became involved in each of those wars.
We despised tyranny; we wished to preserve freedom in the world; and,
each time we moved, we moved in an effort to accomplish that goal.
But, I believe, there is still a question in the minds of most Ameri-
cans; how does one explain our policy in Vietnam? I will offer you my
explanation. I lived with it for a long time. I was involved in it. For
months and months, it seemed in the Johnson administration, we
thought of very little else. And I now know in my mind and in my
heart what did happen. The generation that was in charge of this gov-
ernment and European governments, at the time Hitler started to move,
ended up with a feeling, and I think properly so, of substantial guilt.
Hitler could have been stopped at three separate times. World War II
could have been prevented. When Hitler moved first into the Rhine-
land, he did so in direct contravention of the Versailles Treaty and in
opposition to the Locarno peace pact. The French wrote the British
and the British wrote the French and notes flowed back-and-forth and
they visited back-and-forth but nothing was done. And this part of the
whole performance is incredibly sad. We now know from records that
we obtained from the Nuremberg Trials that when Hitler decided to
move into the Rhineland he did so over the objection of the German
General Staff. The Staff said, "We are not ready." Furthermore, they
said to Hitler, "If you move into the Rhineland and the French mobil-
ize against us, the French being infinitely stronger than we, we will
withdraw our troops immediately."
The French did not move. The British did not move. Do you know
what they did? They talked about peace. They sent delegations back-
and-forth to each other and they said, "We want peace in the world.
We will sit down and talk with Hitler and ultimately we will find
peace." But that went on until the time came when he felt strong
enough, and he rolled into Austria. Now, even after the Rhineland, if
the nations of Western Europe had said to Hitler, "Now you have vio-
lated the treaty. If you move again, then it is war." Again, the records
show that he would not have moved again; he did not have the strength
to do it. He moved into Austria and the same farcical "dance" went on
back-and-forth, letters, meetings, but nothing of substance. Then he
moved into Czechoslovakia and that is the time Chamberlain went
over there and Hitler explained to him that he had no further plans for
any acquisition of any sort. It was not long after Czechoslovakia that
the war started when Hitler's tanks rolled into Poland.
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Now, the leaders of the world understood the default that existed on
the part of the free nations at that time. They also saw what happened
when there was organized resistance to aggression. There had been no
resistance against Hitler, but when the Soviets started to move after the
Second World War, we and the nations of Western Europe organized
and presented a solid front. And we stopped the Soviets and prevented
aggression. So I am convinced in my mind that when Vietnam started,
we had the right principle. The principle was, move early when you see
aggression; move before it spreads. That's the mistake that was made
with Hitler. He became so strong so quickly that they could not stop
him. Move early. It's like excising a cancer before the metastatic proc-
ess begins and affects the whole body politic. So our thought was,
move early.
You will remember President Eisenhower's famous expression, "the
domino theory." He said, "Southeast Asia is just a group of dominos,
that would go down one after another." Now my conviction today is
that our principle was correct but we misapplied it. The Vietnam War
was not a monolithic type of aggression supported by the Soviet Union
and Red China. Upon closer analysis, it has become clear that it fell
more in the category of a civil war in Vietnam. So, I think, we learned
another very important lesson, and that is, you not only have to under-
stand the principles that exist in international affairs but you also must
know how to apply them accurately and properly.
So much for the past. Now as we turn to the present, we see a very
troubled world. Also, as we address our subject of today, I suggest to
you that the determination of what will take place in the next decade
will depend to a great extent upon decisions that the United States
makes in this year, 1980. It appears clear that the area of greatest con-
cern now is Southwest Asia. As you look at it, you see an unstable
Iran. You see Soviet aggression into Afghanistan. You see increasing
pressure on Pakistan. And looming, more importantly and more omi-
nously all the time, you see the Persian Gulf.. And it seems quite clear
that the question of peace or war in the next decade will depend on
developments in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. So we must
look at that area closely.
Our country reacted very strongly to Soviet aggression into Afghani-
stan. I am sure any number of individual Americans must have said,
"But why are we disturbed over Afghanistan? I don't even know where
it is. I am not sure I have ever heard about it before. I have no interest
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in it. It is seven thousand miles away. Why should I be concerned
about Afghanistan?" The answer is, you cannot look at it alone. It is
not an isolated occurrence. It is one element in a broad mosaic and you
have to look at the incursion of the Soviets into Afghanistan in this
broad picture that exists.
First: for twenty years the Soviets have been engaged in a massive
and unique military build-up. We have never seen anything like it
before. I do not know what the reason for it is. We can guess but we
do not know. Now is it truly a massive build-up? Well, I asked the
Defense Department to prepare a brief memorandum for me. Let me
just read it to you, to see if you agree that the Soviets are engaged in a
massive build-up:
The Soviet expenses have increased steadily for the past twenty years.
Relative to the United States, the Soviet's defense effort now is about
fifty-percent higher than the United States' in dollars. The Soviet invest-
ment in research and new weapons is eighty-five percent higher than the
United States'.
The aggregate trends in expenditure tell only a part of the story. They
have increased their armed forces by one million men. They have
quintupled the number of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
They have improved their accuracy. They have added twenty-five divi-
sions to their ground forces. They have a new type of tank. They have
new self-propelled artillery. They have one thousand more first line
combat aircraft. The purposes of this build-up are not entirely clear
but the implications are apparent. The Soviets are developing the ca-
pability to employ military force for purposes other than defense of
their periphery. That has been their excuse before that their only aim
was developing defenses to guard them against any possible aggression
that might come.
In addition to that, there has been a very substantial increase in their
activity in the Indian Ocean, in the Arabian Sea, and in the Horn of
Africa with particular emphasis on Ethiopia and Yemen. Now why,
we do not know. But keep in mind that we see this enormous military
build-up; we see the increased activity in the Indian Ocean and the
Arabian Sea and we keep wondering what the purpose of this is. And
then came this event in Afghanistan.
Our experts have learned that any time a nation changes a policy of
long standing, it warrants a careful examination. For thirty-five years,
ever since the Second World War ended, the Soviets had confined their
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use of Soviet troops to the so-called Warsaw Pact area. No Soviet
troops had been sent outside the Warsaw Pact area, until last December
when eighty thousand fully armed troops moved into Afghanistan.
There was no border dispute. There was no territory that was in con-
troversy between the two countries. It was naked, brutal aggression.
What excuse did the Soviets give? Was it a legitimate and reason-
able excuse? Two main explanations were given. One is, they said,
"We were invited in by the government of Afghanistan." Well, the first
move they made was to execute the then head of Afghanistan and all
the people around him. That excuse does not bear much examination.
Then they said, "The reason we had to move into Afghanistan was
because the United States and Red China are engaged in such exten-
sive activity there that it constitutes a threat against the Soviet Union."
I assure you that is sheer sophistry. There is no merit to that whatso-
ever. So we are back to the main question. Why did they move? Why
the big build-up? Why the increased activity in the Indian Ocean?
As you look back and study Soviet history maybe you begin to un-
derstand it better. We cannot ignore a well known statement made
years ago by a famous Russian. His name was Gorchakov. He made
his comment in 1864 and it surfaces again and again through the years
in the Soviet Union. It's short; I will read it to you:
The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which
are brought into contact with half-savage nomad populations possessing
no fixed social organization. In such cases it always happens that the
more civilized state is forced, in the interest of security of its frontiers and
its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendency over those
whom their turbulent and unsettled character, makes undesirable neigh-
bors.
Now if that is not a perfect description of Afghanistan, I have not read
one.
And, in addition, let me refer again to the Nuremberg Trials because
they were a treasure store of documents that came out of the Third
Reich and the Axis Powers. In 1939 Hitler was moving with very little
opposition. He had gotten to the point where the Soviets could.see the
progress he was making. And you may remember that Hitler entered
into a secret agreement with the Soviets that they were to be allies; they
might appear to be enemies, but they were to be allies. And they en-
tered into an agreement in 1939, and, because victory appeared to be in
their grasp, they began to divide the spoils. And here is a quote from
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the agreement between the Soviets and the Germans in 1939. This part
refers to the Soviets:
"The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center
south of the major territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the
Indian Ocean."
The Soviets have talked about it for years; they have talked about a
warm water port. If the Germans and the Soviets had been successful,
this was to be the booty that was to be awarded to the Soviets. Their
movement toward the Indian Ocean takes them to the Persian Gulf.
To proceed in that direction, by interesting coincidence, they would
have to go through Afghanistan.
Now, what is our concern about the Persian Gull? You might say,
that is also a long way off, and why should we bother about the Persian
Gulf. Again, two or three sentences that I asked for from the govern-
ment:
"The Persian Gulf accounts for two-thirds of the OPEC oil produc-
tion, 34% of global oil. Japan gets 70% of its oil there; West Germany
gets 40%; France gets 70%; United States gets 32% of our oil imports
from the Persian Gulf."
This is our government's position; control of the Persian Gulf oil by
the Soviet Union would mean control of the Western life line. A total
shut-off of Persian Gulf oil would be devastating. It would produce a
collapse of Western economies exceeding the Great Depression of the
1930's. And the memorandum ends by saying, "The economic threat
that would exist, added to the Soviet military threat makes the posses-
sion of the Persian Gulf by the Soviets unthinkable."
Now what should we do in the face of action of this kind? I ask you,
suppose we did nothing? There is only one Nation in the world that
the Soviet Union fears; that is the United States. They move into Af-
ghanistan. If we do nothing, if we say it is none of our business, is there
any doubt in anyone's mind as to what the next step would be? Aggres-
sion grows upon itself. If they move into Afghanistan with no objec-
tion from us, the temptation to move forward would be irresistible. We
had to object. We had to take steps. We had to let them know the
extreme seriousness with which we viewed this brutal aggression into a
neighboring country.
And because we were serious we did a number of things. In the first
place President Carter prohibited the shipment of seventeen million
tons of wheat to the Soviet Union-a good move. He deprived them of
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all fishing rights in areas controlled by us. He required that all Soviet
orders for sophisticated machinery and equipment be cancelled. He
suggested that our young people should register as part of the signal to
the Soviet Union, and he announced that we would send arms to Paki-
stan to let the Soviets know how concerned we are. And lastly, he said,
"We cannot send our Olympic athletes to Moscow, in the face of this
aggression into Afghanistan."
All those actions constitute a message. We could take the other
course that was taken back before World War II and say, "All we are
interested in is peace and we hope you do not go further." I suggest to
you that was a dismal failure; one of the great tragedies in human his-
tory. Just saying we are for peace does not bring peace. That is a snare
and a delusion. You achieve peace by being strong enough that those
who would attempt to break the peace decide that it is not worth the
candle. Just like the Soviets decided it was not worth invading one of
our allies in Europe because it would bring them to war with the
United States of America.
Of these various moves we have made, interestingly enough, I be-
lieve the one that will have the greatest impact on the Soviets is the
cancellation of sending Olympic teams to Moscow. We hope that we
may persuade a number of other countries not to go. The Soviets ex-
plain a great deal to their people by lying to them. They explain, for
instance, that they had to go into Afghanistan because the Americans
and the Chinese were placing troops there and they had become a
threat to the Soviets. Isvestia has a story and an explanation for every
action they take. It is going to be very difficult, however, for them to
explain to the Soviet people why a number of nations do not go to
Moscow this summer and participate in the Olympics.
They have made a great, great event out of the Olympics by putting
hundreds of millions of dollars in it. They have spread the word all
through their country. What it is to them is the acceptance, by the
world, that they desire so greatly.
Do you remember the Olympics in 1936? Hitler mounted the great-
est extravaganza that has ever been mounted and it brought a certain
respectability. People read about it; people saw the pictures. There
was a favorable impression created because of the precision in the way
all was carried out. I remember when the head of the American
Olympic Committee came back from Berlin in 1936 and he said, "We
have got a lot to learn from these people." A lot to learn from the
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greatest murderer in the history of the human race. The man who mur-
dered, in cold blood, six-million Jews. Yet he got respectability with
his Olympic show, and one of our people said, "We have got a lot to
learn from these people." I call it an abomination.
People say you must not mix the Olympics, the sports, with politics.
That has already been done. I came into possession recently of a
brochure that the Soviets have prepared. They printed millions of cop-
ies and have distributed them throughout the Soviet Union. Now you
tell me, after I read you some sentences from this manual, whether or
not you think that there is any way in the Soviet mind of separating the
Olympics from politics. Here is what the manual says:
"The decision to give the honored right to hold the Olympic games
in the capitol of the world's first socialist state has become a convincing
testimony to the general recognition of the historical importance and
the correctness of the foreign policy course of our country."
They say that this is a recognition by the rest of the world of the
correctness of their foreign policy. This is after Afghanistan!
We go there and place our imprimatur of approval upon what the
Soviets have done in Afghanistan, if we accept their concept of the
Olympics. Also, quoting further:
"The Olympics are a recognition of the enormous services of the So-
viet Union in the struggle for peace."
This is their attitude.
"The Muscovites' desire to take upon themselves the organization of
the Olympics was a manifestation of the high ideals of the peace pro-
gram which is consistently carried out by the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union."
This is the message to the Soviet people, and then they want us to
come, and by our presence, they want us to confirm what is fed to the
Soviet people. Listen to this:
"More than ever before in its eighty-year history, the Olympic games
have turned into a van of great social and political importance." I will
quote further:
'The presence in the world of two opposing systems, capitalism
which has outlived its day and socialism which is growing stronger and
stronger with each day, leave their imprint on the Olympic games. The
most critical, ideological struggle between the two opposing social sys-
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tems has an affect in both a direct manner on the choice of cities for the
Olympics."
The point attempted to be made here is that Moscow was selected by
the International Olympic Committee because the Committee wished
to recognize the superiority of socialism over capitalism. The Commit-
tee also wished to recognize the contribution that the Soviet Union has
made to world peace. It wished to recognize the validity of the Soviet
action in conquering the nations on their Western border. It wished to
recognize the legality of the brutal, naked aggression by the Soviets
into Afghanistan. That is what the Soviets want from the Olympics.
And I suggest to you that if we send our team over there, we will then
find it increasingly difficult to bring to the peoples of the world the true
concept of what the Soviet system actually stands for.
Where do we go from here? It is clear to me that as we analyze the
impact of sending our Olympic team, to do so would be a tragic mis-
take. And that brings to mind another item of profound importance.
If these signals we have given to the Soviets are to be meaningful, if
they are to deter them in their aggressive designs and preserve peace in
this decade, our actions must have the support of the American people.
It disturbs me when our government makes the decision, for instance,
that we should cut off seventeen million tons of wheat that we get com-
plaints from the farmers. They say, "Take other steps, but do not do
that. It interferes with the sale of our wheat and corn." We get some
complaints from manufacturers. They say, "No, do not stop shipping
this sophisticated equipment to the Soviet Union; this is trade and we
should keep up trade." We get objection from our young people: "No,
do not reinstitute the registration." Then comes the complaint from
our athletes: "No, we should separate athletics from politics."
It seems to me that our country must unify now as we have never
unified before. We will not find peace in the eighties by merely asking
for it. We will not find peace in the eighties by writing letters back-
and-forth between nations. We will find it by a policy of firmness and
determination and by notifying the Soviets, ahead of time, what the
penalty is if they should move into the Persian Gulf.
One of the greatest documents of all time is the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. I thrill when I read it. I am particularly affected by those
ringing words at the very end of the Declaration. They should be the
guide of the American people today. We must expect to make some
sacrifices for the common good. We cannot do less than our forefa-
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thers, when they said "We mutually pledge to each other our lives, our
fortunes, and our sacred honor."
Thank you very much.
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